Security Risk Assessment (SRA)

[Audio] Security Risk Assessment (S-R-A--) Pengerang LNGT Security Risk Assessment (S-R-A--) Report Head Security Pengerang Region 26 April 2024.

[Audio] Approval Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by Mohd Roslin bin Mamat Norazan bin Omar Haji Rahmat bin Siran Executive Operation Group Security Pengerang Region Manager Operation Security Group Security Pengerang Region Head of Security Group Security Pengerang Region Date: April 2024 Date: Date: Internal.

[Audio] Outlines Introduction Objective Background Reference & Methodology Plant Overview & Location On Ground Assessment Security Incidents Security Risk Assessment Proposed Mitigation Recommendations Way Forward.

PETRONAS Security Policy. PETRONAS Security Policy.

[Audio] Introduction A risk assessment is an important part of any information security process. A risk assessment is used to understand the scale of a threat to the security of information and the probability for the threat to be realized. The result of a risk assessment can be used to prioritize efforts to counteract the threats. The following scenarios illustrate how a risk assessment will assist in making information security decisions. Performing a risk assessment will help determine where to focus resources when to think about modifying functions and when to stop using that function as the risks may not warrant corrective action..

[Audio] Objective To conduct assessment on potential security risk exposure. To identify potential threats and vulnerability levels to assets. To propose recommendation for enhancement of security measures..

[Audio] Background GS Pengerang Region has conducted S-R-A on P-L-N-G-T assets located offsite Pengerang Integrated Complex (P-I-C--) from 16 18th April 2024. The S-R-A was conducted to assess threats vulnerabilities and impact towards P-L-N-G-T assets located at nearest PIC. All access to PLNGT is restricted to 24 hours of security control via the main gates. P-L-N-G-T still in processes to get a gazetting by the government as a protected place under the Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 1959 Pengerang L-N-G (Two) Sdn Bhd is located on a reclaimed land between Tanjung Kapal and Tanjung Ayam in the Mukim of Pengerang. The location is approximately 115 kilometers by road from Johor Bahru. The Pengerang L-N-G (Two) Sdn Bhd will receive and store L-N-G-T from L-N-G-C vaporize the L-N-G-T and deliver natural gas to the Pengerang Integrated Complex (P-I-C--) Pengerang Cogeneration Plant (P-C-P--) and other consumers via the Peninsular Gas Utilization (P-G-U--) grid. The L-N-G-T will deliver natural gas at the L-N-G-T battery limit at a maximum pressure of 68.95 barg and a minimum temperature of 15 degrees celsius. The terminal is designed for 98% availability and is not expected to be shutdown totally. However some sections of the terminal may be shut down during maintenance. A LNGT unloading/reloading berth (Berth 6204) is located at Jetty 2 owned by Pengerang Terminals (Two) Sdn Bhd (P-T-2-S-B). This Berth 6204 is provided with process and safety equipment required for the L-N-G unloading/reloading operations. L-N-G-T are part of Regasification business’ facilities. P-L-N-G-T began its commercial operation in the four quarter of 2017. The facilities receive vessels carrying L-N-G from around the world and offer a wide range of services including L-N-G regasification (Capacity: 490 millimetersscfd at PLNGT) L-N-G reloading and gassing up cooling down. The distance of the pipeline between the jetties and the P-I-C is 4.6 kilometers. P-L-N-G-T was incorporated to undertake the development construction and This S-R-A shall be the catalyst to further mitigate any security risk on operation of the facilities required for the handling storage and distribution of the products for Pengerang Integrated Complex at Pengerang Johor A complete or partial failure on any of the assets could result in significant direct impacts to P-I-C operational capability making these assets potentially attractive targets to perpetrators..

[Audio] Reference & Methodology Reference Process of S-R-A is based on or make reference to: petronas Security Policy petronas Security Management System (SeMS) 2.1 Security Risk Management Section 2.2 petronas Minimum Security Standards (M-S-2--) – Section 7 petronas ERM Framework petronas Risk Library ISO 31000: 2009 – Risk Management: Principles and Guidelines ISO 31010: 2009 – Risk Management: Risk Assessment Technique Methodology S-R-A process consists of the following steps: Context Setting is an important element to gain and understanding of the facility. Risk Identification is an activity to generate a comprehensive list of security risks and identify their respective causes and consequences. This involves Threat Identification and Assessment (T-I-A--) tool to understand the threat environment of the country and region where facility is located. Risk Analysis is an activity which involves developing an understanding of the security risks by assessing vulnerability of the facility to identified risks and effectiveness of current and proposed security mitigation measures. Risk Evaluation is an activity which involved evaluation of identified security risks to compare the level of risk against the risk criteria when the context was considered. Risk Treatment involves selecting one or more strategies to modify risk through implementation of mitigations..

[Audio] Plant Overview & Location 1. PLNGT is Malaysia’s second L-N-G regasification terminal after Regasification Terminal Sungai Udang (R-G-T-S-U) built primarily to serve the refinery and petrochemical customers at the Pengerang Integrated Complex (P-I-C--). L-N-G-T features two L-N-G storage tanks with a total capacity of 400000 cube meters. 2. PLNGT is located on a reclaimed land between Tanjung Kapal and Tanjung Ayam in the Mukim of Pengerang. The location is approximately 115 kilometers by road from Johor Bahru. The Pengerang L-N-G-T will receive and store L-N-G from LNGC vaporize the LNG and deliver natural gas to the Pengerang Integrated Complex (P-I-C--) and other consumers via the Peninsular Gas Utilization (P-G-U--) grid. 3. The Pengerang L-N-G-T will deliver natural gas at the Pengerang L-N-G-T battery limit at a maximum pressure of 68.95 Barg and a minimum temperature of 15 degrees celsius. The terminal is designed for 98% availability and is not expected to be shutdown totally. However some sections of the terminal may be shut down during maintenance. A LNG unloading/reloading berth (Berth 6204) is located at Jetty 2 owned by Pengerang Terminals (Two) Sdn Bhd (P-T-2-S-B). This Berth 6204 is provided with process and safety equipment required for the L-N-G unloading/reloading operations..

[Audio] Layout PLNGT Gates. 10. Layout PLNGT Gates.

[Audio] Terminal Routes & Jetty Route Patrol There are 2 patrol points in the jetty area which are the outer arm and Berth 6204 where the patrol duty starts from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m. involving 3 patrols carried out. Patrols are made once every 4 hours which is every time the patrol takes 2 hours. Patrols in the terminal area have 9 points..

[Audio] PMO Patrol Routes at Executive Operation Area During the 3-year period from 2021 until now there no major security incidents were reported. Only minor security incidents were reported involving fisherman intrusion activities. As a matter of fact a total of 20 APs personnel have of the responsible assets at the highest level. All APs personnel on duty are equipped with body cameras and are monitored by the Control Center Room (C-C-R--) PMO 24 hours a day. been approved to increase the number of patrol and enforcement assignments to ensure the safety.

[Audio] The area of the PMO-Executive Operation Area (E-O-A--) patrol is 3 nanometers x 7 nanometers which is outside of international passage area (Singapore Straits). Currently a number of 16 APs are responsible to carrying out duties which involve 2 boats with 4 APs onboard (boat crew). Equipped with outboard machinery (O-B-M--) with 115-hp and 225-hp. The sea boat named as P-D-T-1 and PDT2..

[Audio] On Ground Assessment GS Pengerang Region has conducted S-R-A on P-L-N-G-T assets located offsite Pengerang Integrated Complex (P-I-C--) from 16 18th April 2024. The S-R-A was conducted to assess threats vulnerabilities and impact towards P-L-N-G-T assets located at nearest PIC. Pengerang L-N-G-T still in processes to get a gazetting by the government as a protected place under the Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 1959. P-L-N-G-T boasts three access points the primary entrance (main gates) the product entry point (product post) and the jetty access (jetty post). The vigilant presence of on-duty auxiliary police (A-P---) guarantees the utmost security for PLNGT's valuable assets around the clock. All access into Pengerang L-N-G-T are restricted with 24 hours Security control via main gates..

[Audio] Marine Police Patrol Routes at Executive Operation Area The patrol of the Marine Police Force of the Zone Penebuk involved 3 boats: 2 boats from the Marine Police of the Zone Penebuk while the other boat was from Marine Force Region 2 Tampoi. The patrol area starts from Sungai Santi then through the Tanjung Penyengat area and to Tanjung Sedili. Along this route these boats will pass through the waters of the Executive Operation Areas(E-O-A--) P-T-2-S-B and PLNGT which run 10 hours a night and 10 hours a day. It is carried out not according to the specific time which changes according to the current needs and plans. Each boat that patrols will make a boat change after 4 days of operation. For information each boat will involve 4-5 personnel on duty. A total of five (5) boats were used to carry out the patrol. For marine police records during the period from 2021 to 2024 no incidents classified as major security incidents were reported. The environmental conditions and maritime areas of P-T-2-S-B and P-L-N-G-T are at a controlled level. In the event of any intrusion or encroachment case involving any group or individual the AP personel or staff on duty will immediately inform the C-C-R and subsequently the C-C-R will channel the information to the Marine Police MMEA Navy and P-M-O for further action. Every action taken is noted and reported to HSE PT2SB and PLNGT..

[Audio] On Ground Assessment Following the assessment below is the summary of present security mitigation/measures that being implemented throughout P-L-N-G-T assets ; 1. Prosedure Facility shall have an approved Site Security Plan and written Standard Operating Procedures (S-O-P--) for security operations in place 2. Physical Security Guards stationed at the main entrance (main gate) must be stationed at fixed posts with additional features including an automatic bar controlled by on-duty security personnel. P-L-N-G-T need to request P-M-O for more aggresive prevent any encroachment/intrusion. P-M-O must show omni presence to instill a sense of deterrence it's crucial to have the presence of P-M-O serve as a deterrent to potential intruders. 3. Manpower Additional AP personnel are recommended to supplement the existing four personnel stationed at the guard post enhancing control over the movement of materials vehicles and individuals to maintain the highest level of security..

[Audio] On Ground Assessment Areas Current Measures Observation/ Findings Physical Security No boom gate was placed in front of the guard house. It exposes intruders and commits criminal activity. Post guards in front of the main entrance (main gate) should be made with a fixed post which inside must also be equipped with an automatic bar that can be controlled by the security personnel on duty.

[Audio] Areas Current Measures Observation/ Findings Physical Security The P-M-O only conducts regular patrols according to the scheduled time. There is no regular monitoring of the time that fishermen or intruders carry out trespassing activities in the area. P-L-N-G-T should inform P-M-O to ensure effective preventive action against any encroachment or intrusion by fishermen and other intrusions. P-L-N-G-T need to request P-M-O for more aggresive prevent any encroachment/intrusion. P-M-O must show omni presence. A total of 16 cases of encroachment by fishermen were reported in 2023 and throughout January to March 2024 we recorded a total of 16 cases as well. This shows that P-M-O preventive measures are inefficient and require more efficient mitigation to ensure that the amount of encroachment can be lowered..

[Audio] Areas Current Measures Observation/ Findings Manpower Only one security guard is on duty and there is no proper monitoring. Post guards in front of the main entrance (main gate) should be made with a fixed post which inside must also be equipped with an automatic bar that can be controlled by the security personnel on duty Insufficient security manpower for wide area security monitoring AP personnel must be added to the 4 personel assigned to the guard post in front of the main gate to ensure that the control of in and out of material vehicles and persons can be enhanced for the survival of security at the highest level.

[Audio] On Ground Assessment Product Gate. On Ground Assessment.

[Audio] Fencing. On Ground Assessment. Fencing. A fenced in area with gravel and wire Description automatically generated with medium confidence.

[Audio] PLNGT Security Incidents Overall Security Incidents Security Incident – 2022 (1 Cases) Types of Crimes Bring out CPU Contraband Item Document Forgery 1 1 1 Column1 March 1 The response time to the site is between 10 – 15 minutes depending on the nearest location of the mobile response team (Patrol). As of 2022 there were only one security incident cases consist of contraband (kratom).That cases were taken place outside process area As of 2023 there were 2 security incident cases consist of document forgery and 1 cases on attempt to bring out C-P-U from office. Security Incidents – 2023 (2 Cases) Total SI January March 1 1.

[Audio] Risk Assessment Threat Threat Rating Impact Impact Rating Vulnerability Risk Rating 1. Act of terrorism (bomb threat arm attack / hijacking) an attractive asset to create attention to government. a) Terrorist attacks against oil and gas facilities inside Malaysia including PLNGT are remote. Intelligence received from reliable sources including R-M-P and N-S-C implies that the probability of such an attack is low. There is no intent or capability to inflict damages on the said facilities. b) Terrorists hijackers and bombers commit such criminal acts to obtain the attention of the government to achieve their goal of damaging the image reputation and assets of P-L-N-G-T c)There is no known or reported evidence that regional terrorist groups are seeking to acquire weapons or explosives for use in carrying attacks on oil and gas or other critical national infrastructure Despite the relatively low terrorism threat level in Malaysia we must remain vigilant and unwavering. LOW a) Moderate loss to the asset. May cause breakdown to key activities leading to reduction in operational capabilities. b) Terrorist organizations or hijackers/bombers employ maritime seizure tactics targeting vessels and personnel with the aim of garnering widespread national attention to further their objectives or agenda. c) Disruption of business operations and uncertainty on the business recovery. d) Such an attack may also cause serious reputational damage to the company. In some instances it may cause fatalities and injuries to people and have an environmental impact on the surroundings. major Deter: Good Controls are effective. Detect: Good Controls are effective. Delay: Excellent Controls are very effective. Response: Excellent Controls are very effective. L-O-W.

[Audio] Threat Threat Rating Impact Impact Rating Vulnerability Risk Rating 2.Robbery / piracy threats a crime magnet with enormous amount of valuable assets a) Pirates make the sea the main avenue for robbery and threats to P-L-N-G-T assets as well as contractors and staff. b) There is no intent or capability to inflict damages on the said facilities. LOW a) A Groups of robbers / pirates have the potential to carry out robberies on ships operating in storage and material distribution to the PLNGT. It will pose a threat to business travel and damage the reputation of P-L-N-G-T and the country thus affecting the country's economy. b) Disruption of business operations and uncertainty on the business recovery. c) May cause breakdown to key activities leading to reduction in operational capabilities. major Deter: Good Controls are effective. Detect: Good Controls are effective. Delay: Excellent Controls are very effective. Response: Excellent Controls are very effective. L-O-W.

[Audio] Threat Threat Rating Impact Impact Rating Vulnerability Risk Rating 3.Demonstrations/Protest/Strikes a) Non-violent or violent specific action against a site (including blockade or occupation of the site) by a group of protest including N-G-O and political movement. b) So far there have been no reports or intelligence information obtained or channeled by the Special Branch IPK Johor or E2(M) Bukit Aman in connection with any group N-G-O workers union or political party attempting to hold a demonstration or protest. Good relations with Special Branch are continued with regular meetings with them from time to time to address this issue. LOW a) Civil society entities including N-G-O-s political party labor unions and foreign workers voice dissent on various matters such as wage disputes inequitable recruitment practices for foreign labor contract terminations and unfavorable allocation of work contracts. b) In the worst-case scenario the repercussions could tarnish PLNGT's specific reputation and petronas broader image exerting adverse impacts on both domestic and international investor confidence particularly regarding future ventures associated with petronas. moderate Deter: Excellent Controls are very effective. Detect: Excellent Controls are very effective. Delay: Excellent Controls are very effective. Response: Excellent Controls are very effective. L-O-W.

[Audio] Threat Threat Rating Impact Impact Rating Vulnerability Risk Rating 4.Intrusion / encroachment by adversaries from land sea or air (e.g drone) a) Small commercial vessels leisure craft or fishermen in small boats fishing in traditional' fishing spots encroach on and/or enter the exclusion safety zone and cause a hazard to petronas's facilities in other words Jetty port tanker/ship and others. b) Hazards include the potential for collisions disruptions to the tanker or ship's movements or berthing. Damage to vessels of fire risk from the use of explosive devices in confined waters or near Jettys tanker anchorages or oil and gas terminals. c)The current mitigation measure was implanted by PLNGT’s management and hiring Pengerang Marine Operation’s Marine Auxiliary Police to safeguard the jetty/port area could reduce the risk. d) Intruders could threaten P-L-N-G-T assets by achieving specific goals using the latest technology moderate a) A suicide drone carrying a high-powered explosive or energetic fuel payload deliberately crashed into process area tanks or tank farms causing a major fire or explosion. In some instances it may cause fatalities and injuries to people and have an environmental impact on the surroundings. b) Small commercial vessels leisure craft or fishermen in small boats fishing in traditional 'fishing encroach on and/or enter the exclusion safety zone and cause a hazard to petronas/contractor’s facilities in other words Jetty port tanker/ship and others. c)Hazards include the potential for collisions disruption to the tanker's movements or berth and damage to vessels from the use of explosive sources in confined waters or near Jetty’s tanker anchorages or oil and gas terminals that will cause disruption to the operation. d) Disruption of business operations and uncertainty on the business recovery. e) Such an attack may also cause serious reputational damage to the company. major Deter: Good Controls are generally effective. Detect: Good Controls are effective. Delay: Satisfactory Controls are generally effective. Response: Good Controls are generally effective L-O-W.

[Audio] Threat Threat Rating Impact Impact Rating Vulnerability Risk Rating 5.Theft/ break-in a) Potential break-ins/ theft including snatch theft by unauthorized personnel into offices and vehicles within P-L-N-G-T b) Both of the installations are in remote areas that are occupied by small communities (villagers). c)With the small population driving factors for trespassing and unauthorized entry to the premises are low. d)However we could not rule out that the contractors could be the cause of the incident. But the opportunities are quite limited due to current security measures in other words total security manpower physical security (perimeter) et cetera that were put in place. LOW a) Based on the ground survey and interviews with staff and contractors there have been no recorded cases of break-ins / theft from worksites offices commercial buildings petty crime street mugging and assault on the street. b) Normally of break-ins / theft from worksites offices and commercial buildings into the plant will be committed by the individual with the intention of stealing scrap materials. c) Such intention could create an unconducive environment if it is not prevented properly. LOW Deter: Good Controls are effective. Detect: Good Controls are effective. Delay: Excellent Controls are very effective. Response: Excellent Controls are very effective. L-O-W.

[Audio] Security Risk Assessment. 28. Security Risk Assessment.

[Audio] By implementing the proposed security measures security risks for the event will reduce to an acceptable level.

[Audio] Security Risk Assessment Risk (R1) Act of terrorism (bomb threat arm attack hijacking & hostage taking) an attractive asset to create attention to government Terrorist groups use communication technology to make bomb threats or hijack important assets of P-L-N-G-T by threatening the government in order to get the government's attention to achieve a specific agenda. Risk (R2) Robbery / piracy threats a crime magnet with enormous amount of valuable assets Pirates use sea routes to carry out robberies or threats. Risk (R3) Demonstration/Protest/Strikes Non-violent or violent specific action against a site (including blockade or occupation of the site) by a group of protest. Groups or individuals use certain issues or agendas in protesting/Demonstrating within the P-L-N-G-T area or in front of the main entrance of PLNGT. to achieve the purpose of explaining the reputation of PLNGT. Risk (R4) Intrusion / encroachment by adversaries form land sea or air (e.g drone) Intruders use the latest technology using drones by air sea and land routes to achieve their goals. Risk (R5) Theft/ break-in Potential break-ins/ theft including snatch theft by unauthorized personnel into offices and vehicles within P-L-N-G-T compound. Current mitigations Brown Field Recommended mitigations As per recommendations Internal.

[Audio] Proposed Mitigations The proposed measures below are recommended to manage risks and shall be taken into consideration to further minimize the risks. No Area Concern Proposed Mitigations 1. Manpower Security Manning To consider deploying petronas Auxiliary Police to enhance security protection by increasing security manning in the following manner: Post Guard – 1 Corporal 3 Auxiliary Police (Tasks include manning security entrance and to conduct patrol to associated facilities / emergency response) 2. Physical Security Manning Guards stationed at the main entrance (main gate) must be stationed at fixed posts with additional features including an automatic bar controlled by on-duty security personnel. P-L-N-G-T need to request P-M-O for more aggressive prevent any encroachment/intrusion. P-M-O must show omni presence to instill a sense of deterrence it's crucial to have the presence of P-M-O serve as a deterrent to potential intruders. 3. Procedure Plan and Procedures To establish Site Security Plan for PLNGT To establish security Incident Action Plan in other words terrorist/bomb threat sea encroachment theft et cetera and conduct drills 4. Physical Engagement / Awareness To engage with: Regular and substantive interaction with community representatives including Wakil Rakyat (Y-B---) Ketua Kampung residents and labor unions is vital for effectively addressing a wide arange of issues in a harmonious manner. Local community as a form of deterrence. To collaborate with R-M-P (Pengerang Police Station IPD Kota Tinggi/IPK Johor/MMEA/Navy/PMO) for immediate response to incident as well as to monitor the facilities from time to time..

[Audio] Recommendation Area of Concern Recommendatios Timeline Action Party Procedural Facility shall have an approved Site Security Plan and written Standard Operating Procedures (S-O-P--) for security operations in place Q42024 PLNGT Physical (Permanent Post Guard & An automatic bar) Post guards in front of the main entrance (main gate) should be made with a fixed post which inside must also be equipped with an automatic bar that can be controlled by the security personnel on duty. Q22025 PLNGT Physical (Omni-Present) P-L-N-G-T should inform P-M-O to ensure effective preventive action against any encroachment or intrusion by fishermen and other intrusions. P-L-N-G-T need to request P-M-O for more aggresive prevent any encroachment/intrusion. P-M-O must show omni presence to instill a sense of deterrence it's crucial to have the presence of P-M-O serve as a deterrent to potential intruders Q42024 PLNGT/PMO Main Power AP personnel must be added to the 4 personel assigned to the guard post in front of the main gate to ensure that the control of in and out of material vehicles and persons can be enhanced for the survival of security at the highest level. Q12025 PLNGT.

[Audio] Way forward petronas Security Policy The proposed security measures to be planned for implementation..

[Audio] Hyperlink 1.MS2 PLNGT Plant 2.MS2 Terminal & Port 3.TIA Tool PLNGT 4.PLNGT Matrix.

[Audio] Thank You Internal. Thank You. Internal.

[Audio] Threat Assessment Act of terrorism (bomb threat arm attack hijacking and hostage taking) an attractive asset to create attention to government a) Terrorist attacks against oil and gas facilities inside Malaysia including PLNGT are remote. Intelligence received from reliable sources including R-M-P and N-S-C implies that the probability of such an attack is low. There is no intent or capability to inflict damages on the said facilities. b) Terrorists hijackers and bombers commit such criminal acts to obtain the attention of the government to achieve their goal of damaging the image reputation and assets of PLNGT c) There is no known or reported evidence that regional terrorist groups are seeking to acquire weapons or explosives for usein carrying attacks on oil and gas or other critical national infrastructure. Despite the low threat of terrorism in Malaysia we cannot rule out or discount it. Threat Rating:LOW Robbery / piracy threats a crime magnet with enormous amount of valuable assets a) Pirates make the sea the main avenue for robbery and threats to PLNGT assets as well as contractors and staff. b) There is no intent or capability to inflict damages on the said facilities. Threat Rating:LOW Demonstrations/Protest/Strikes a) Non-violent or violent specific action against a site (including blockade or occupation of the site) by a group of protest including N-G-O and political movement. b) So far there have been no reports or intelligence information obtained or channeled by the Special Branch IPK Johor or E2(M) Bukit Aman. In connection with any group N-G-O workers union or political party attempting to hold a demonstration or protest. Good relations with Special Branch are continued with regular meetings with them from time to time to address this issue. Threat Rating: LOW L = 3 H = 11 M = 11 3 = 8 = 4 2 Low range : 3 plus 4 = 7 L = 0 to 7 Medium range : 11 plus 7 = 18 M = 7 to 18 High range : 47 plus 19= 66 H = 66 above.

[Audio] 4. Intrusion / encroachment by adversaries from land sea or air (e.g drone) Small commercial vessels leisure craft or fishermen in small boats fishing in traditional' fishing spots encroach on and/or enter the exclusion safety zone and cause a hazard to petronas's facilities in other words Jetty Por tanker/ship and others. Hazards include the potential for collisions disruptions to the tanker or ship's movements or berthing. Damage to vessels of fire risk from the use of explosive devices in confined waters or near jettys tanker anchorages or oil and gas terminals. The current mitigation measure was implanted by PT2SB’s management and hiring Pengerang Marine Operation’s Marine Auxiliary Police to safeguard the jetty/port area could reduce the risk. Intruders have the opportunity to threaten P-T-2-S-B assets by achieving specific goals using the latest technology. Threat Rating:MODERATE 5. Theft/ break-in Potential break-ins/ theft including snatch theft by unauthorized personnel into offices and vehicles within PT2SB Both of the installations are located in remote areas that are occupied by small communities (villagers). With the small population driving factors for trespassing and unauthorized entry to the premises are low. However we could not rule out that the contractors could be the cause of the incident. But the opportunities are quite limited due to current security measures in other words total security manpower physical security (perimeter) et cetera that were put in place. Threat Rating:LOW L = 3 H = 11 M = 11 3 = 8 = 4 2 Low range : 3 plus 4 = 7 L = 0 to 7 Medium range : 11 plus 7 = 18 M = 7 to 18 High range : 47 plus 19= 66 H = 66 above.

[Audio] Impact Assessment 1.Act of terrorism (bomb threat arm attack hijacking & hostage taking) an attractive asset to create attention to government a) Terrorist organizations or hijackers/bombers employ maritime seizure tactics targeting vessels and personnel with the aim of garnering widespread national attention to f urther their objectives or agenda. b) Disruption of business operations and uncertainty on the business recovery. c) Such an attack may also cause serious reputational damage to the company. In some instances it may cause fatalities and injuries to people and have an environmental I mpact on the surroundings. Impact Assessment:MAJOR Robbery / piracy threats a crime magnet with enormous amount of valuable assets a) A Groups of robbers / pirates have the potential to carry out robberies on ships operating in storage and material distribution to the PIC. It will pose a threat to business travel and damage the reputation of P-T-2-S-B and the country thus affecting the country's economy. b) Disruption of business operations and uncertainty on the business recovery. Impact Assessment:MAJOR 3. Demonstrations/Protest/Strikes a) Civil society entities including N-G-O-s political party labor unions and foreign workers voice dissent on various matters such as wage disputes inequitable recruitment practices for foreign labor contract terminations and unfavorable allocation of work contracts. b) In the worst-case scenario the repercussions could tarnish PT2SB's specific reputation and petronas broader image exerting adverse impacts on both domestic and international investor confidence particularly regarding future ventures associated with petronas. Impact Assessment:MODERATE L = 3 H = 11 M = 11 3 = 8 = 4 2 Low range : 3 plus 4 = 7 L = 0 to 7 Medium range : 11 plus 7 = 18 M = 7 to 18 High range : 47 plus 19= 66 H = 66 above.

[Audio] 4. Intrusion / encroachment by adversaries from land sea or air (e.g drone) a) A suicide drone carrying a high-powered explosive or energetic fuel payload deliberately crashed into process area tanks or tank farms causing a major fire or explosion. In some instances it may cause fatalities and injuries to people and have an environmental impact on the surroundings. b) Small commercial vessels leisure craft or fishermen in small boats fishing in traditional 'fishing encroach on and/or enter the exclusion safety zone and cause a hazard to petronas/contractor’s facilities in other words Jetty Por tanker/ship and others. c) Hazards include the potential for collisions disruption to the tanker's movements or berth and damage to vessels from the use of explosive sources in confined waters or near jettys tanker anchorages or oil and gas terminals that will cause disruption to the operation. d) Disruption of business operations and uncertainty on the business recovery. e) Such an attack may also cause serious reputational damage to the company. Impact Assessment:MAJOR 5. Theft/ break-in a) Based on the ground survey and interviews with staff and contractors there have been no recorded cases of break-ins / theft from worksites offices commercial buildings petty crime street mugging and assault on the street. b) Normally of break-ins / theft from worksites offices and commercial buildings into the plant will be committed by the individual with the intention of stealing scrap materials. c) Such intention could create an unconducive environment if it is not prevented properly. Impact Assessment:LOW L = 3 H = 11 M = 11 3 = 8 = 4 2 Low range : 3 plus 4 = 7 L = 0 to 7 Medium range : 11 plus 7 = 18 M = 7 to 18 High range : 47 plus 19= 66 H = 66 above.