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Bringing Excellence to Safety Teams (BEST) ( A Professional Development Program) Accident Theory.

Obje c tive. Understand why theories and models of the accident process are important. Common structural and functional features of accident theories. Understand the nature of accident theories. Relat i ons h ip between accident m odels and haz a r d recognition techniques..

The Organization & Accident Causation. Organization Humans System Control Risk Health Safety Work (Impacts Health & Safety) Causation Socio-Political Context [Influenced by] Causation Hazard Working in Organization is a system By understanding Accident Models By understanding Accident Models.

What is an Accident. Accidents have been broadly defined as: A short, sudden and unexpected event or occurrence that results in an unwanted and undesirable outcome … and must directly or indirectly be the result of human activity rather than a natural event..

Accident models affect the way people think: about safety, how they identify and analyze risk factors, and how they measure performance; Accident models can be used in both reactive and proactive safety management; and many models are based on an idea of causality ... accidents are thus the result of technical failures, human errors or organizational problems..

Evolution of Accident Modelling. Single Cause (Root) Multiple Causes (Latent) Complex Outcomes [Emergent].

Management Models (Domino Models). Psychological Models Behavioral Models Decision Models Ergonomic Models Energy Models Safety Systems Models.

Management (Domino) Models. C ON T A C T. L O S S.

Management (Domino) Models. C ON T A C T. Multi-Causation Model.

Management (Domino) Models. Accident. Outco m es.

Management (Domino) Models. Accident. Multi-Causation & Total Loss.

Fault Tree – “AND” & “OR”. Injury to Lathe Machine Operator.

Management (Domino) Models. Post-Contact Domino, Emergency Response C ON T A C T Emergency Response C A U S E S L O S S.

Management (Domino) Models. Post-Contact Domino, PPE C ON T A C T PPE C A U S E S L O S S.

Management (Domino) Models. Post-Contact Analysis C ON T A C T Eme r g en cy Response, PPE C A U S E S Anal y s i s L oss.

Ba r rier Failure. Cyclic Model. Ch an g e. Id e n t i fy H az a r ds.

Heinrich Pyramid Model. 300 Nearmiss Incidents. 1 Major Injury.

Birds Accident Ratio Model. 1 Ma j or Inj ur y 10 Minor Injuries 30 Property Loss 6 00 Nearmiss Incidents.

Herbert Henrichs Domino Theory of Accident Causation.

Herbert Henrik's Domino Theory of Supervisor Control.

Birds Domino Model. Management Loss of Control. Basic Cause(s).

Updated Birds Accident Sequence. Lack of Control Inadequate Program Inadequate Standards Inadequate Compliance to Standards.

1. Lack of Control by Management – Failures Inadequate Inspections Ineffective Safety Meetings No New Employee Training Poor Accidents Investigations No Job Safety Analysis Outdated Procedures.

3. Immediate Causes- Symptoms Unsafe Practices Operating without Authority Operating at Improper Speed Disable Safety Devices Not using PPE Improper Lifting Unsafe Conditions Inadequate Guards Fire & Explosion Excess Noise Inadequate Lighting.

Birds ISMEC Model. I I dentification of work required to achieve S S tandards established for the work activity M M easurement of performance by compliance with the standards E E valuating the work performance C C orrecting deficiencies (& commending success)..

The ISMEC Model. • • • • • • • •. Risk Management Change Management Training & Competence Communication Hiring & Promotions Contractor Management Off-the-Job Safety Other Activities.

Adam’s Domino Model. 27.

Adams Domino Theory. Management Structure Objective Goals Performance Standards Appraisals Measurements Organization Chain of Command Span of Control Delegation of Authority Delegation of Responsibility Staff Operations Layout Equipment Procurement Scheduling Procedures Environment.

Adams Domino Theory. Tactical Errors Unsafe Acts Unsafe Conditions Accident / Incident Injury Producing Incident Nearmiss Incident Property Damage Incident.

Adam’s Accident Sequence. 30.

The IRS Model. Post Contact Acts. L OSS. Executives.

IRS Model & Due Diligence. Principles. Policies, Systems.

Legal Duties & IRS Model. Dir e c t or Duties. Executive Duties.

Accident Proneness Theory. Number of People. Number of Accidents.

Kerr’s Goals Freedom Alertness Theory. Freedom. Goals.

Petersen’s Motivation Reward Satisfaction Theory.

Adjustment Stress Theory. I n t e r n al Stress. I n t e r n al Stress.

The Ferrell Theory. OVERLOAD (a mismatch of capacity & load in a state LOAD CAPACITY STATE Task Natural Capacity Motivational Level Physical Physical Condition Arousal Level Mental State of Mind Environment Training Light & Noise Drugs & Pollutants Distraction Pressures Other Stressors Fatigue Internal Stressors - Impair Worry Ability to respond Emotional Situational Vague goals Danger INCOMPATIBILITY Stimulus-Response Response-Response Control Display • Inconsistent Control Stimulus-Stimulus WORK STATION Inconsistent Display Types • Size • Reach Force • Feel IMPROPER ACTIVITIES Didn’t Know Deliberately Took Risk Low Perceived Probability of accident Low perceived cost of accident.

Petersen's Accident-Incident Causation Model. DECISION TO ERROR TRAPS OVERLOAD – a mismatch of HUMAN ERROR ACCIDENT / INCIDENT INJURY or LOSS SYSTEMS FAILURE Policy Responsibility Authority & Accountability Measurement Inspection Training & Selection SOPS & Standards Risk Management Logical Decision Unconscious Desire to Error Peer Pressure Boss Actions Management Priority Personal Values Proneness Mental Problems Of the incident occurring or a Loss occurring Perceived low probability Workstation Design Size Force Reach Feel Stereotypes Human Capabilities Expectations Inconsistencies Incompatible displays or controls Natural Endowment Physical Condition State of mind Knowledge – Skill Drugs Fatigue Task Information Processing Environment Situational Hazards Motivational Attitudinal Arousal Biorhythmic CAPACITY with LOAD in a STATE.

Behavioral Psychology Model. P h y s i c al Factors K nowled g e Factors A t titudes Values E x ec ution Factors Behavior Change Techniques Nearmiss Property Loss At-Risk behavior Behavior Change Process First Aid Incidents Recordable Incidents Lost Workday F at ali t y Co n trol C a use.

ABC Accident Prevention Model. Top 5 are SUCCESS indices from a proactive approach.

ABC Accident Prevention Model. Activator. Behavior.

Ball Energy Model. All Hazards Involve Energy Destructive Energy Sources Critical Energy Needs High Energy E n vir o n me n t High Energy C o mp on e n t Low Energy Phen o me na P h y si c a l Needs P h y sio l ogi c a l Needs Energy Release / Transfer Mechanism Energy Loss / Excess Demand Mechanism Unsafe Condition Unsafe Act De si g n Manufacturing P r oc e du r e Sup e r vis i on HAZARD CONTROL DEFICIENCY.

Ball Energy Model. Forms of Energy Gravitational Falls Kinetic Human, Machine, and Material Energy Thermal Burns (Hot & Cold), hypothermia, heat stress, & solar Biological Infections, disease & pathogens Chemical Corrosion, reactions (exothermic, endothermic, explosive, toxic, carcinogenic & teratogenic) Water Asphyxiation, motive force, & extreme temperature Electrical Ionization, non-ionizing Radiation Attacks, bites & stings Animal Attacks, bites & stings Stored Potential Motive force (coiled springs), pressure (steam, compressed gases) Noise Machine, human & environment Multiple Kinds Interaction of 2 or more of the above.

Module 1. Locate & Define Operational Error. WHY the unsafe Ac t / C on d ition P er m i t t ed.

Personal Factors : Environmental Factors. Unsafe Act.

Firenze Man-Machine Model. Man Machine Environ T A S K I N F O Risks Decisions.

Surry Decision Model. Man and Environment. Hazard – Imminent Danger.

CSA Accident Information Model. Initiatory Phase Concluding Phase Result Phase Investigate to Determine D e vi a tions/ Inadequ at e Standards Related Co n tribu t ing factors Use CSA Checklist Sequence of Events.

CSA Energy Barrier Trace. Unwanted Energy is Released Unwanted Energy Flows Unwanted Energy Contacts Target Barriers on Energy Sources Barriers between Energy Source & Target Barriers on Target Target Injury or Damage Energy Source / Hazard.